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REVIEWS
THE LAW OF TORTS. By Fowler Harper and Fleming James, Jr. Boston: Little
Brown & Co., 1956. 3 Volumes, pp. xxv, 2062. $60.00.
THIS publication by two Yale law professors who have been in the forefront
of the writers on torts is a notable event. No other modem book covers in
such detail and with such extensive citations the entire field of torts, and this
one will undoubtedly find its place as a most useful tool, both in law offices
and in law schools.
The first volume consists of what the authors call "Intended Torts," including
the trespasses, conversion, defamation, malicious prosecution, interference with
privacy, deceit and interference with business relations. The many cases cited
and the many extracts from judicial opinions give a correct picture of the law
and the divergence of authority, but there is comparatively little critical com-
ment. The volume follows the Restatement analysis by putting the privileges
after each tort, a permissible arrangement but one which leads to considerable
duplication in the chapters dealing with trespasses. The matter of nuisance is
included among the trespasses, which I think is desirable, but the organization
of the two books requires omission here of negligent nuisance, which is not so
happy.
The criticisms which follow are not intended to reflect upon the value of this
volume as an attorney's tool. But there are a few shortcomings which may affect
its use by beginning students, whose education requires great care in the use of
language. The title of the volume, Intended Torts, is susceptible of misunder-
standing. The useless and at times misleading distinction made in the Restate-
ment of Torts between "assent" and "consent" has been retained.' There is
no discussion of the distinction between consent and its manifestation. In the
use of the word "possession" it is not clear whether the writer has in mind
factual situations or the legal relation.2 The phrase "volitional act"3 is tauto-
logical, as is "affirmative act ' 4 and "overt act." 5
The material on trespasses to the person does not stress the fact that today
these actions are of importance only because harm is unnecessary. The state-
ment that for an assault there must be a physical movement 6 adopts the
language of some of the opinions rather than stating what I believe to be the
effect of the cases, that is, that any conduct causing anticipation of a substantially
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consent is treated as a privilege,8 although it is part of the plaintiff's case to
deny the existence of either.
In dealing with nuisance, the authors adopt the Restatement analysis,9 but
they include within the category of strict liability those situations in which
the defendant, although knowing the physical results, believes that his conduct
is not tortious. In fact, in such cases, the defendant intends the result, and un-
like the situations involving strict liability, he is liable because his conduct is
wrongful.
The chapter on deceit, which adopts in large measure the approach of the
Restatement of Torts, does not seem to me to be sufficiently clear in outline.
Among other difficulties, it does not make clear the peculiar problems involved
in estoppel,10 which, in its sporadic operation, runs counter to some of the
fundamental ideas implicit in the action of deceit. On the other hand, I agree
with the authors' criticism of the language of courts which profess to find fraud
in innocent statements when made as of a party's own knowledge ;11 and the
authors' treatment of promises and prophecies 12 is also sound. The entire
chapter, however, does not, I believe, give sufficient emphasis to current pro-
gress.
The last chapter, dealing with interference with business relations, covers
interference with contracts but omits unfair competition and labor law. These
omissions are probably desirable, since today these matters are generally taken
up in separate courses and separate treatises.
The second volume, labeled Accidents, but perhaps better entitled Liability
for Unintended Physical Consequences, is a work properly distinguishing be-
tween legal fault, moral fault and no fault. It includes a masterly presentation
of the negligence problems, and is one which every instructor in torts should
read with the greatest care. In it are discussed not only the cases which indicate
the growth and present condition of the law, but also the enormous mass of
writings called forth by the intriguing nature of the subject. The authors ad-
vance, in season and out, their conviction that strict liability represents, and
should represent, the wave of the future. But in doing so they have not twisted
the facts of the cases, nor, in general, used disparaging adjectives rather than
logic in supporting their cause. Thus, the cases on strict liability give a faithful
picture of the decisions, in which the limitation of liability to the risks created
by the defendant's conduct is similar to the limitations in the negligence field.
Taking Fletcher v. Rylands 1 3 as a point of departure, the authors indicate the
change in the application of this doctrine to extra-hazardous activities in this
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In the chapter on the nature of negligence, the authors point out, with many
illustrations, that negligence is conduct and not a state of mind. They then deal
with the attributes of the fictional reasonable man, and the factors determining
whether a party has departed from the standard. I like the handling of wanton-
ness, which I agree should be based upon an objective standard.
Under the heading of specific standards of conduct, the authors consider the
functions of the jury, the court and the legislature in fixing standards. As we
might expect, they do not like fixed standards, since these tend to restrict
liability. I was somewhat disappointed at the brevity of the discussion of "duty
of affirmative action,"' 5 but what is said is sound.
Res ipsa loquitur is properly minimized as a distinct rule, but it was not sur-
prising that the anomalous rule of Ybarra v. Spangard 16 is used as an argument
for strict liability.1 7 In dealing with legal cause, the authors adopt the Cardozo
view of risk as a defining and limiting element, and say that, although this view
does not approximate certainty in forecasting its result, it comes closer to pre-
dictability than any other suggested formula.'5 The only matter I miss is a
discussion of the changes in risk following a tortious impact, as where a defend-
ant's act, under identical circumstances, in one case throws the plaintiff upon
the road and in another throws him upon the sidewalk. These changes in risk
seem to be an important part of the picture of "legal cause." Finally, assumption
of risk 10 is properly distinguished from contributory negligence, with which
it has frequently been confused.
The authors' desire to compensate the injured person's harm leads them not
only to say that contributory negligence is a "Draconian rule sired by a medieval
concept of cause out of a heartless laissez-faire," 20 but also causes them to sup-
port the results of the last clear chance rule, even while recognizing its illogical
character.2 1 Further, the authors oppose contribution among tortfeasors, since
this causes plaintiffs more difficulty.2 2 They oppose even more strongly the
doctrine of comparative negligence in cases where multiple participants harm
each other, since it tends to relieve insurance companies from some of their
liability.23
Again, as we might expect, in dealing with employers' liability, the authors
would allow recovery against a master by an injured hitchhiker invited to ride
by an unauthorized servant,2 and they are glad to note, correctly, that courts
are enlarging the area of the employer's liability to third persons. The remain-
ing chapters on the liability of landowners and suppliers maintain the high
standard of the earlier chapters, and the same tendency to urge strict liability.
15. Pp. 1044-53.
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As to strict liability: The time consumed by the courts in negligence cases,
the element of chance in securing compensation, the swollen verdicts obtained
by some of the expert operators, and the very real need of protection to persons
made indigent by disaster, may cause a profound change in the rules. To carry
the authors' ideas to a logical conclusion, each person or household should be
required to be insured against all forms of disaster. There is the same economic
loss whether harm is caused by slipping in a bath tub or being run over by a
negligent or non-negligent driver. The premium could be collected as a tax;
as in social security, the amount of the tax and the compensation could be ad-
justed to income. Surely the state is the best "spreader of the loss." Such an
approach would eliminate waste in the court room and elsewhere even more
than do Workmen's Compensation Acts. Without advocating such a system,
I think it is preferable to one of strict liability, which has many difficulties that
have not been sufficiently explored to enable us to judge its workability. I do
not subscribe to the idea that negligence as a factor in liability is passing nor
that it should pass out, although I do agree that basing liability on legal fault
does not substantially minimize the slaughter on the highway.
Again may I say that the reading of the book was interesting and educational.
I suggest it for consideration and thought by all three branches of the legal
profession.
WAExN A. SEAvEYt
THE LAW OF ZONING. By James Metzenbaum. New York: Baker, Voorhis
& Co., 2d ed., 1955. 3 Volumes, pp. xxix, 2531. $35.00.
THE rise of'zoning in the second decade of this century was a symptom not
of urban progress but of urban decline. It followed a new emphasis on "effici-
ency" in city administration and a new contempt for beauty.' Even within the
narrow compass of its potential usefulness, zoning has not been successful: in
1942 a study concluded that non-conforming uses were increasing rather than
decreasing ;2 and given the wretched standards of enforcement generally pre-
vailing,3 it is unlikely that this trend has since been reversed. 4
tBussey Professor Emeritus of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. TUNNARD & REE, AMERICAN SKYLINE 171, 172-73 (1956).
2, Comment, Amortization of Property Uses not Conforming to Zoning Regulations,
9 U. CHI. L. REv. 477, 479 (1942).
3. See, e.g., Lwis, A Nzw ZONING PLAN FOR THE DisTRicr oF COLUM!BIA 6 (1957).
A unique aspect of zoning lies in the fact that boards of zoning adjustment can grant
variances and exceptions without showing the reasoning on which their decisions are based
in published reports or opinions. Hence there is no need for consistency, lawyers have no
means of analyzing the board's past policies, and "contacts" and "influence" are at a
premium. See, e.g., Note, Zoning Variances and Exceptions: The Philadelphia Experience,
103 U. PA. L. REv. 516, 529, 533 (1955), which also comments on inadequate enforcement,
id. at 552.
4. It is true that there has been a trend towards ordinances requiring the termination
of non-conforming uses after a reasonable period of time, which have been upheld by the
[Vol : 66
